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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ADoLPH CooRs
poration,

CoMPA~Y,

a corPlaintiff,

vs.

LIQUOR CoNTROL CoMMISSION OF
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THE STATE OF u TAR'

No. 6245

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATE!1ENT OF THE CASE.
This matter is presented upon the allegations in
the Complaint and Application for Writ of Prohibition
as put in issue by the Demurrer of the Defendants.
The Defendant, Utah Liquor Control Commission,
adopted regulation number 20 on April 7, 1939, regulating 0ontainers in which light beer may be sold. Plaintiff is desirous of offering eight ounce bottles of beer
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for sale in Utah, which size is not allowed by regulation
number 20.
If defendants fail to squarely meet the arguments
of plaintiff it is by reason of our agreement to file
simultaneous briefs. Oounsel for plaintiff has, however,
advised us that his points are as follows:
1. That the defendant is without authority and
proceeded beyond and in excess of its jurisdiction in
adopting sub-section (b) of regulation number 20, and
2. That if this Court should find the defendant had
such power that by adopting sub-section (b) of regulation number 20, such action of the Commission was
arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory.
ARGUMENT.
The part of regulation number 20 objected to is in
the following language :
(b) ~ o brewer, dealer or wholesaler shall
adopt or use in the State of Utah any container
for beer differing in size from the following:
11
12
22
24
32
64

oz.
oz.
oz.
oz.
oz.
oz.

of beer
·of beer
of beer
of beer
of beer
of beer

Whole barrels
Half barrels
Quarter barrels
Eighth barrels

This matter being presented upon the Alternative \~·rit
of Prohibition does not give the Court the benefit of the
factual background that motivated and justified the
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Commission in enacting this regulation. If illusions are
made to the factual backgTound the absence of a record
will have to excuse the references.

Among other things, the Commission, by Section 7
of Article 3 of Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1935, is empowered as follows:
The commission may, fron1 time to time, make
such resolutions, ~orders and regulations, not inconsistent with this act, as it may deem necessary
for carrying out the provisions thereof and for
its efficient administration. The commission shall
cause such regulations to be filed in the office
of the secretary of state, and thereupon they shall
have the same force as if they formed a part of
this act. The commission may amend or repeal
such regulations, and such amendn1ents or repeals
shall be filed in the sa1ne manner and with like
effect. The con1mission may from tin1e to tin1e
cause such regulations to be printed for distribution in such manner as it may deen1 proper.
There apparently is no question but "'hat sub-section
(b) of regulation number 20 is adopted pursuant to the
procedure outlined in this section. Analysis of Section
7 indicates that "the commission may

*

*

*

make

* • * regulations, not inconsistent with this act, as
it may deem necessary for carrying out the provisions
thereof and for its efficient administration.''

We will

assume by reason of the issuance of the Alternative Writ
in this matter that for the purpose of this proceeding the
Court will deem sub-section (b) of regulation number
20 to be necessary for the carrying out of the provisions
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of the Utah Liquor Control Act and f.or its efficient
administration.

DEFENDANT'S FIRST POINT.
THE DEF'ENDANT, UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION, HAS
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE. CONTAINER SIZES OF LIGHT
BEER IN UTAH AND IN DOING SO ACTED WITHIN ITS
JURISDICTION.

Plaintiff's first point does not raise any constitutional question. It does not question the power of the
defendants to enact regulations. Plaintiff apparently
takes the position that although the Legislature has
delegated to the defendants the power to make certain
rules and regulations, that this power does not encompass the power and authority to make a regulation
such as sub-section (b) ,of regulation number 20. To
phrase it another way, that the delegation of authority
to the defendants is not broad enough to encompass
the regulation of container sizes for light beer. This,
of necessity, leads us to a discussion of the rule making
power. One of the classical discussions on this subject
is in Mr. Justice Cardozo '·s dissenting opinion in the
case. of

Pananta Refining Company vs. Ryan,
293 U. S. 388, 79 L. Ed. 466.
''All that Congress could safely do was to
declare the act to be done and policies to be promoted, leaving to the delegate of its power the
ascertainment of the shifting facts that would
determine the relation between the doing of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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aet and the attainn1ent of the stated ends. That
is what it did. It said to the President in substance: You are to consider whether the transportation ,of oil in excess of the statutory quotas
is offensiYe to one or more of the policies enulnerated in Sec. 1, whether the effect of such conduct
is to promote unfair con1petition or to waste the
natural resources or to demoralize prices or to
increase unemployment or to reduce the purchasing po·wer of the workers of the nation. If these
standards or smne of them have been flouted with
the result of a substantial obstruction to industrial recoYery you 1nay then by a prohibitory
order eradicate the mischief. * * *
"'In what has been written, I have stated, but
without developing the argument, that by reasonable implication the power conferred upon the
President by Section 9 (c) is to be read as if
coupled with the words that he shall exercise
the power whenever satisfied that by doing so he
will effectuate the policy of the statute as theretofore declared. Two cannons of interpretation,
each familiar to our law, leave no eseape from
that conclusion. One is that the meaning of a
statute is to be looked for, not in any single
section, but in all the parts together and in their
relation to the end in view. Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U. S. 76, 89, 51 L. Ed. 96, 102,
27 S. Ct. 29; McKee vs. United States, 164 U. S.
287, 41 L. Ed. 437, 17 S. Ct. 92; Talbott v. Silver
Bow Oounty, 139 U. S. 438, 443, 444, 35 L. Ed.
210, 211, 213, 11 S. Ct. 594. The other is that
when a statute is reasonably susceptible of two
interpretations by one of which it is unconstitutional and by the other valid, the court prefers
the meaning that preserves to the meaning that
destroys. United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v.
Deleware & H. Co., 23 U. S. 366, 407, 53 L. Ed.
836, 848, 29 S. Ct. 527; Knights Templars' & ~L
Life Indem. Co. vs. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205,
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47 L. Ed. 139, 145, 23 S. Ct. 108. Plainly, See. 1,
with its declaration ·of the will of Congress, is the
chart that has been furnished to the President
to enable him to shape this course among the
reefs and shallows of his act. If there could be
doubt as to this when Sec. 1 is viewed alone, the
doubt would be dispelled by the reiteration of the
policy in the sections that come later. In Sec. :2,
which relates to administration agencies, in See.
3, which relates to Codes of Fair Competition, in
Sec. 4, which relates to agreements and licenses,
in Sec. 6, which prescribes limitations upon the
application of the statute, and in .Sec. 10 which
permits the adoption of rules and regulations,
authority is conferred upon the President to do
. one or more acts as the delegate of Congress when
he is satisfied that thereby he will aid 'in effectuating the policy of this title' or in carrying out its
provisions. True Sec. 9, the one relating to
petroleum, does not by express words ·of reference
embody the same standard, yet nothing different
can have been meant. What, indeed, is the alternative? Either the ·statute means that the President is to adhere to the declared policy of Congress, or it means that he is to exercise a merely
arbitrary will. The one construction invigorates
the act; the ·other saps its life. A choice between
is hard.
''I am persuaded that a reference, express or
implied, to the policy of Congress as declared
in Sec. 1 is a sufficient definition of a standard
to make the statute valid. Discretion is not
unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within
banks that keep it from flowing. Marshall Field
& Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 39 L. Ed. 294, 12
S. Ct. 495; United States v. Crimaud, 220 U. S.
506, L. Ed. 563; 31 S. Ct. 480; and J. vY. Hampton,
Jr., and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 72
L. Ed. 624, 48 S. Ct. 348, state the applicable
principle. Under these decisions the separation
of powers between the Executive and Congress
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
is not a doctrinaire concept to be umde use of
with pedantic rigor. There must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of
government, which cannot forsee today the developments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite
variety.
In United States v. Grin1aud, (1911) 220 U. S.
506, 33 L. Ed. 563, 31 S. Ct. 480, the court stated:
'' Fron1 the beginning of the government various
acts have been passed conferring upon executive
officers power to make rules and regulationsnot for the government of their department, but
for the administering of the laws which did govern. None of the~e statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated
and indicated its will, it could give to those who
were to act under such general provisions 'power
to fill up the details' by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation
of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed
by Congress or measured by the injury done.''
Adopting the language of Justice Cardozo, the problem raised by Plaintiff's first point is, where are the
banks that confine the rule making power of the Gommissi,on? Thi·s court has already upheld the regulations
of the Commission relative to the advertising of beer
upon billboards in the case of

Bird and J ex Company, et al., v. J. W. Funk,
et al., 85 P. (2d) 834
where the court announced the rule in the following
language:
Where the legislature delegates to an administrative agency po\ver to make rules and regulaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tions, such delegation must be accompanied by a
declared policy outlining the field within which
such rules and regulations may be adopted.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495,
55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947;
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55
S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446; State v. Goss, 79 Utah
559, 11 P. (2d) 340. From this it must necessarily
follow that all rules and regulations adopted by
an administrative board or agency must be in
furtherance of and follow out the declared policies of the legislative enactment. If the regulations or rules are in excess ,of the declared purposes of the statute, they are invalid. State v.
Goss, supra; Utah Mfrs. Ass 'n v. Stewart, 82
Utah 198, 23 P. (2d) 229.

A further instructive statement from this court on the
same subject is taken from the recent case of
Rowell v. State Board of AgricultrLtre,

99 P. (2d) 3
(1) That the legislature may not surrender
or delegate its legislative power is elemental.
It may, however, provide for the execution
through administrative agencies of its legislative
policy, and may confer upon such administrative
officers certain powers and the duty of determining the question of the existence of certain
facts upon which the effect or execution of its
legislative policy 1nay be dependent. l\IcOrew v.
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d)
608; Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58
S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L. Ed. 1129. Said the New
York Court in Elite Dairy P~oducts v. Ten Eyck,
271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. (2d) 606, 609: "The Legislature may properly authorize an administrative officer to * * * determine questions of
fact. Any discretion there left to the admnistraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tive officer is -confined to a desig·nated field, and
within that field rests, not upon unfettered choice,
but upon the applicati·on of rules or reason to
facts proven or found.'' In Thompson v. Smith,
133 Ya. ~1G7, 13-! S. E. 379, 584, 71 A. L. R. 604,
the court said: "It is a fundamental principle
of our system of government that the rights of
men are to be deternrined by the law itself, and
not bv the let or leave of adrninistrative officers
or bu.reaus. This principle ought not to be surrendered f>Or {'Onvenience or in effed nullified for
the sake of expediency. It is the prerogative and
function of the legislative branch of the go,Ternn1ent, whether state or municipal, to determine
and declare what the law shall be, and the legislative branch of the govern1nent may not divest
itself of this function ·or delegate it to executive
or administrative officers.'' The court further
said: "The majority of the cases lay down the
rule that statutes or ordinances vesting discretion
in administrative officers and bureaus must lay
down rules and tests to guide and control then1
in the exercise of the discreti•on granted in order
to be valid * * *." And in .Mutual Film Corp.
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230,
239, 35 S. Ct. 387, 392, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas.
1916C, 296, it is said: ''The legislature must
declare the policy of the law and fix the legal
principles which are to control in given cases;
but an administrative body may be invested with
the power to ascertain the facts and conditions
to which the policy and principles apply.''
Applying this to the problem at hand we must revert
to Section 7, where the defendants are empowered to
make "regulations not inconsistent with this act, as may
be deemed necessary for carrying out the provisions
thereof and for its efficient adnrinistration." Two banks
are established by this Secti•on, the first is, that the
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regulations must not be inconsistent with the act, and
second, that it must be deemed necessary to carry out
the provisions of the act and for its efficient administration. Section 8 in sub-section ( s) empowers the Commission to make "all needful 'regulations for the carrying out of the provisions of this act.'' Plaintiff probably
inquires, but where is there anything within this language
to indicate that the Legislature intended that the Commission should regulate light beer containers 1 Section
96, among other things, makes it unlawful ''for any person to manufacture, sell ~or otherwise dispose of any
bottled beer in containers of a capacity of more than
64 fluid ounces.'' Here is another bank or levy restraining and limiting this rule making power in that we
now find that the power to regulate is from 1 to 64 fluid
ounces and not more, and that the regulation must not
be inconsistent with the act and deemed necessary for
the carrying out of the provisions thereof.

Another

section which must be included within this discussion is
Section 2, outlining the purposes the Legislature sought
to serve by the enactment of the Liquor Control Act.
This section reads :
This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police
powers of the state for the protectiron of the
public health, peace and morals; to prevent the
recurrence of abuses associated with saloons; to
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful
manufacture, selling and disposing of alcoholic
beverages; and all provisions of this act shall be
liberally construed for the attainment of these
purposes.
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In other words, the defendants in the performance
of their duties under the Liquor Act enacted sub-section
(b) of regulati•on nuinber 20, on the theory that by so
doing they were protecting the public health, peace and
morals of the citizens and for the purpose of preventing
the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons and to
eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture and selling of alcoholic beverages •on the theory
that the regulation was one deemed necessary for the
earrying out of the provisions of the Act.
Xow the regulation in question is not attacked on
the ground that there are t•oo many sizes, or that the
size of containers allowed by sub-section (b) are not
actually needed and used in the manufacturing and distributing ·of light beer within the State of Utah, but
rather, the regulation is attacked on the ground that there
is no such power to regulate container sizes within the
Commission. In ·other words, Plaintiff's position is that
a licensed brewer, distributor or retailer should he allowed to sell beer in any size container, from 1 to 64 fluid
ounces, including all fractions or any number included
therein. In other words, if Plaintiff is entitled to sell an
8 ounce bottle the same argument that sustains his
position and contention, would sustain his position and
desire to sell a 6 ounce, 4 ounce or a 34 ounce bottle.
This court, in the Bird and J ex case, supra, found
that the provis•o in Section 140 ''that advertising of light
beer shall be permitted under such regulations as the
Commission may make'' became an exception to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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general prohibition against the advertising of alcoholic
beverages contained in Section 140. The last sentence
of Section 96 prohibits the sale of bottled beer in containers of more than 64 fluid ounces, being a prohibition
against sale of bottled beer in larger containers by leaving the regulation of sizes less than 64 fluid ounces to the
general regulatory p•owers of the Commission granted by
Sections 7 and 8.
An examination at this time as to the reason which
prompted the Legislature to leave certain ·subjects to the
regulation of its Commission might be worth exploring.
It seems obvious that the only reaHon for any legislative body to leave to a commission, bureau or executive the making of any regulations would be that the·
Legislature in endeavoring to accomplish its ends was
uncertain as to the applicable regulation to accomplish
its stated end, and so for the purpose of accomplishing
its end, first set forth the purpose to be accomplished
and then established the means by which the end should
be accomplished and then left to the commission, bureau
or executive the power of adopting the particular means
to the shifting facts for the purpose of accomplishing
the stated end.
An examination of the statute as it applies to the
taxation of bottled beer clearly illustrates and demonstrates the problem presented to the Legislature. Section 83 of Article 5, ·of Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1935,
provides as follows:
Beer may be manufactured, sold, delivered, distributed, bottled, shipped or transported or reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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moved for storage or eonsu1nption or sale within
this state, or possessed or consumed therein or
imported into or exported therefrom in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this
act, or in the regulations, and not otherwise.
It will be noted that this section contemplates the
Commissi·on regulating the manufacturing, selling, delivering, distributing, bottling, shipping, transporting,
possessing and consun1ption of beer within the State of
Utah. \Yhile Section 96 provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person to import, receive, possess, dispense, sell, give, offer for sale,
deliver, distribute, ship, transport or store or in
any manner use, either in the original package
or otherwise, any beer unless the excise tax imposed by this act shall have been paid and unless
a stamp or label showing such tax to have been
paid shall be affixed to the barrel, bottle, or other
immediate container of the beer; provided, that
the commission may by regulation provide the
conditions under which brewers licensed under
this act may possess beer before the tax shall be
paid thereon and the conditions under which they
may export beer from the state without the payment of the tax. It shall be unlawful for any
person to keep, sell, or otherwise dispose of any
bottled beer in containers of a capacity of more
than sixty-four fluid ounce·s, and shall be s-o·ld only ·
in the original containers.

The Legislature, by this section, clearly contemplated
that the manufacture, sale and distribution of beer,
from the time of its manufacture to its sale to the consuming publie, should be regulated by statute or by regulation.

Now as to the method of collecting the tax, we
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find in Section 102 of Article 5, of Chapter 43, Laws of
Utah, 1935:
The state auditor is hereby directed to have prepared, according to such specifications and designs
and in such denominations as may be submitted to
him by the state tax commission, stamps for use
on packages and containers .of beer subject to tax
under the provisions of this act. Upon requisitions from the state tax commission the state
auditor shall deliver to its order the stamps designated in such requisition and shall keep an
accurate record of all stamps coming into and
leaving his hands. The cost ·of such stamps shall
be charged to the general fund of the state.
And in Section 103 of Article 5, ,of Chapter 43, Laws of
Utah, 1935:
The state tax commission shall at all times obtain
and keep on hand or available stamps of denominations suitable for paying the tax on containers
of beer ordinarily in use at the time, including
bottles, jugs and cans, of a maximum c.apacity
of 16 ounces; bottles of a maximun1 capacity of
32 ounces; bottles of a maximum capacity of 64
ounces; kegs ·of a maximum capacity of one-eighth
barrel; kegs of a maximum capacity of onequarter barrel; and barrels of maximum capacity
of 31 wine gallons. The state tax commission
may, in its discretion, cause to be prepared and
kept on hand stamps of other denominations. The
stamp affixed to any immediate c-ontainer under
the provisions of the act must be sufficient to pay
the tax upon the maximum capacity of such container, and if stamps are not provided by law or
in the discretion of the state tax commission of
denominati·ons accurately adapted for the payment of the tax on the container of the next
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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higher capacity. ~nvh stmups shall only be sold
bY the state tax conllllission to those who have
satisfied said commission under such regulations
as it may prescribe that they are authorized to
use the stamp. The state tax corn1nission 1nay, in
its discretion, establish reasonable tolerance with
relation to the maxinn1m capacity of containers
and the tax to be paid with respect thereto.
Section 95 in1poses an excise tax of eighty cents per barrel of thirty-one gallons.

It imn1ediately becon1es apparent that if there is
no regulati·on governing container sizes that under the
act beer may be sold in containers from less than one
ounce up to sixty-four ounces, and as a part of the duties
of the Utah Liquor Control Commission and the Utah
State Tax Commissi·on that stamps must be prepared
for all sizes of containers that the distributors may
desire.
It further becomes apparent from the tenure of all
the sections of the act that the legislature intended that
beer should be manufactured, sold and delivered under
strict supervision and control. It must be borne in mind
that at the time this act became effective that the Legis-

lature of this State had not enjoyed any practical experience with the regulation of beer for some twenty years.
Realizing this the legislature clearly indicated the end
to be accomplished and to the best of its ability the
means to be used to accomplish the end and then empowered its commission to complete the pattern by regulati-on.
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It is respectfully submitted that the regulatory
power of the Commission encompasses the power to
regulate container sizes for light beer.

SECOND POINT.
SUB-SECTION (B) OF REGULATION NUMBER 20 IS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR DISCRIMINATORY.

This point pre-supposes a review of the action of
the Commission in enacting the questioned regulation.
In other words, plaintiff says that in view of all the facts,
in view of all the ·customs of the trade, that the Commission, in adopting container sizes specified in subsection (h), supra, acted arbitrarily, capriciously and
dis criminatorily.
It is respectfully submitted that this question cannot
be acted upon by this Court without having before it the
same facts that were before the defendant Commission
when it adopted the regulation. In other words, there
is nothing before this Court at this time to indicate to
this Court what the practice is relative to the sale of
light beer. There is nothing before this Oourt to advise
it of the cost to the brewer, to the wholesaler and to the
distributor of infinite ·container sizes. There is nothing
before this Court to indicate the commercial abuses
which arise through uncontrolled container sizes.
One of the keen desires of the Legislature as expressed by their Section 2 of the Liquor Act, was to
prohibit a return of the abuses of the old saloon. What
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are the abuses connected with the old .saloon and in what
way did those abuses revolYe about the sale of beer~
"?hat was the so-called "tied house" and what was the
vice connected with the so-called "tied house'' and why
was it that the brewer became the owner of the dispensaries wherein their product was sold 1 And what is
the relation between beer sold through grocery stores
and that sold for consu1nption on the premises and how
do container sizes affect the so-called "drive-in'' trade
and what is the competition in varying container sizes
and what is the difference between an eight and eleven
ounce bottle in actual appearance, and will eight ounce
bottles be pawned off as eleven ounce bottles, and what
is the relation between bottled beer and draught beer?
These, and a multitude of other questions, are pertinent
as to whether or not the regulation in question is arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.

It is respectfully submitted that any regulation has
within its being certain elements of discrimination and
arbitrariness. But the question is whether or not it is
so arbitrary as to affect and violate the rights of the
questioning party. Until plaintiff's argument as to the
discrimination that is being practiced against his client
is made more clear and definite and until the way in
which defendants were capricious in enacting sub-section
(b), supra, is at least outlined and their arbitrariness
is made more explicit, defendants prefer to rest this
part of the plaintiff's argument on the sole basis, that
until a record is before this Court nothing that can be
done or said in briefs or by counsel that can properly
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advise this Court that it may adequately review the
action of defendants in establishing this regulation.
To pass upon this regulation in the manner in which it
is now before this Court would be to ask this Court to
reflect its judgment on container sizes for light beer
without any exposition of the problem, which is factual.
The ·only factual matter defendants offer to this Court
is that regulation number 20, sub-.section (·b), encompassed all bottle sizes in use in Utah at the time of its
adoption.
Respectfully submitted,..
D.

HowE MoFFAT,

GEORGE

H.

LUNT'

Attorneys for Defendants.
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